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Abstract
In recent years, different types of adversarial examples from different fields have emerged
endlessly, including purely natural ones without perturbations. A variety of defenses are
proposed and then broken quickly. Two fundamental questions need to be asked: What’s
the reason for the existence of adversarial examples and are adversarial examples unsolv-
able? In this paper, we will show the reason for the existence of adversarial examples is
there are non-isomorphic natural explanations that can all explain data set. Specifically,
for two natural explanations of being true and provable, Go¨del’s sentence is an adversarial
example but ineliminable. It can’t be solved by the re-accumulation of data set or the
re-improvement of learning algorithm. Finally, from the perspective of computability, we
will prove the incomputability for adversarial examples, which are unrecognizable.
Keywords: adversarial example, Go¨del’s sentence, machine learning
1. Introduce
Adversarial examples have attracted significant attention in recent years. They have emerged
in image(Goodfellow et al., 2014; Engstrom et al., 2017), audio(Carlini and Wagner, 2018;
Taori et al., 2019; Qin et al., 2019), text classification(Samanta and Mehta, 2017; Lei et al.,
2019) and NLP (Alzantot et al., 2018; Niven and Kao, 2019; Zhang et al., 2019; Eger et al.,
2019). The reason for their existence remains unclear. Previous work has proposed dif-
ferent answers from the perspective of data set and learning algorithm, including the data
set is not big enough(Schmidt et al., 2018), not good enough(Ford et al., 2019) or not
random enough(Weiguang Ding et al., 2019), and the learning algorithm is not complex
enough(Bubeck et al., 2018; Nakkiran, 2019) or not robust enough(Xiao et al., 2018; Stutz
et al., 2019). Moreover, in Shafahi et al. (2018), it’s shown that for certain classes of prob-
lems (on the sphere or cube), adversarial examples are inescapable. In this paper, for a
simple binary classification problem, we will propose an adversarial example—Go¨del’s sen-
tence, which is not caused by data set or learning algorithm. In our example, for any finite
or any decidable infinite data set, for any learning algorithm, Go¨del’s sentence will always be
there as an adversarial example and ineliminable. It can’t be solved by the re-accumulation
of data set or the re-improvement of learning algorithm.
First of all, what are adversarial examples? The definition of adversarial example now is
almost all based on perturbations. For instance, in Shafahi et al. (2018), a formal definition
of an adversarial example is as follows.
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Consider a point x ∈ Ω drawn from class c; a scalar  > 0; and a metric d. We say
that x admits an -adversarial example in the metric d if there exists a point xˆ ∈ Ω with
C(xˆ) 6= c; and d(x, xˆ) ≤ . (C : Ω→ {1, 2, ...,m} is a “classifier” function.)
However, adversarial examples are not limit to the type of perturbations, like Figure 1.a
& 1.b(Goodfellow et al., 2014; Thys et al., 2019). Recent work has shown there are many
purely natural adversarial examples without any perturbations, like Figure 1.c(Hendrycks
et al., 2019). It’s inappropriate to understand the latter as the normal wrong outputs and
only the former as the adversarial examples. Otherwise we will fall into an infinite regress to
argue which special type of wrong output is an adversarial example and which is not, because
any insular definition will be so difficult to reconcile with the facts observed in practice.
Therefore, it’s necessary to redefine adversarial example beyond perturbations, which is also
important for us to apprehend the reason for their existence, and their unsolvability in our
example.
(a) Perturbations in digital
world.
(b) Perturbations in real world.
(c) Without perturbations,
natural example.
Figure 1: Three different types of adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Thys et al.,
2019; Hendrycks et al., 2019)
Second, are adversarial examples unsolvable? In this paper, the specific adversarial
example, Go¨del’s sentence, is ineliminable. It can’t be solved by re-accumulation of data
set. Adversarial training(Goodfellow et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2017) can’t be helpful because of
the ineradicable incompleteness. It can’t be solved by re-improvement of learning algorithm,
either. Each learning algorithm must be equivalent to a Turing machine, no matter it’s based
on logistic regression, SVM or neural network. However, changing one Turing machine to
another Turing machine won’t be helpful, because no Turing machine can learn something
from nothing.
Finally, before we redefine adversarial example and study their unsolvability, some es-
sential issues about them in machine learning need to be clarified. Especially, what is the
ground truth, what is to be learned, what can be expressed by data set, and what is expected
to express by us through data set? Maybe the answers to these issues are so self-evident
that they are ignored for a long time. Actually, none of these answers is clear, although
they are thought self-evident. However, Russell’s paradox always reminds us that danger
is always in the unclarity. Once these issues are clarified, the reason for the existence of
adversarial examples will be clear. There are three main contributions in this paper.
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1. We will point out the reason for the existence of adversarial examples is there are
non-isomorphic natural explanations that can all explain data set.
2. We will show that Go¨del’s sentence is an adversarial example but ineliminable.
3. We will prove the incomputability for adversarial examples, which are unrecognizable.
2. Related Work
Adversarial examples are first demonstrated in Szegedy et al. (2013) and Biggio et al.
(2013) in digital world. They can be generated by adding pixel-level changes to a normal
image(Goodfellow et al., 2014; Papernot et al., 2017) or doing simple rotation and transla-
tion to a normal image(Engstrom et al., 2017; Alcorn et al., 2019). They also exist in real
world. By placing a few stickers in real world, a physical stop sign is recognized as a speed
limit 45 sign(Eykholt et al., 2018), images are misclassified(Liu et al., 2019), and Autopilot
goes to the wrong lane, because it identifies stickers as road traffic markings(Ackerman).
By wearing a adversarial patch in real world, the person is difficult to be identified(Thys
et al., 2019; Komkov and Petiushko, 2019). There are also adversarial examples of audio in
real world(Li et al., 2019). Excluding the perturbations in digital world (pixel-level changes,
rotation and translation) and in real world (stickers and patches), recent work has shown
there have been plenty of purely natural adversarial examples in real world without any
perturbations (Hendrycks et al., 2019), like Figure 1.c.
Many solutions for adversarial examples have been proposed, like adversarial train-
ing(Goodfellow et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2017), network distillation(Papernot et al., 2016),
classifier robustifying(Abbasi and Gagne´, 2017), adversarial detecting(Lu et al., 2017), input
reconstruction(Gu and Rigazio, 2014) and network verification(Katz et al., 2017). However,
almost all solutions are shown to be effective only for part of adversarial attacks (Yuan et al.,
2019).
Recent work has also made encouraging progress to clarify some essential issues about
adversarial examples. What can be expressed by data set? More technically, what is the
meaning of label in data set? The extraordinary work in Ghorbani et al. (2019) shows the
difference between “basketball” and basketball, the former is a meaningless label in data set,
and the latter is a word meaning a sphere or a sport. It’s shown that the most important
concept for predicting “basketball” images is the players’ jerseys rather than the ball itself.
Moreover, even if there are only the basketball jerseys without ball itself in a image, it can
still be classified as the class “basketball”. What is to be learned? The remarkable work in
Ilyas et al. (2019) shows that what are learned by machine can be non-robust features, but
what human can understand and will want machine to learn are robust features, however
they are both in data set, and adversarial example is a natural consequence of the presence
of highly predictive but non-robust features in standard data sets.
3. Meaning of Label
To interpret what can be expressed by data set and reveal that it’s quite different from what
is expected to express by us through data set, we need to figure out what the label in data
set means, which is crucial for us to understand why there can be different explanations
that can all explain data set. Here is a binary classification problem for cats and dogs.
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3.1 Where Are Cats?
The data set is in Figure 2. If we were native English speakers, we would adopt the label
of type1. And, where are cats?
Label Label
Image-I type1 type2 type3 type4 Image-II type1 type2 type3 type4
cat chat 0 dog dog chien 1 cat
cat chat 0 dog dog chien 1 cat
cat chat 0 dog dog chien 1 cat
Figure 2: Data set of cats and dogs
For Human For Machine
Fact.1h
In Image-I, there are images of animals
who can meow and catch mice.
Fact.1m In Image-I, there are some legal png files.
Fact.2h
The label of left type1 is “cat”, a word
which means the animal who can meow
and catch mice.
Fact.2m
The label of left type1 is “cat”, a symbolic
string which is meaningless.
Fact.3h
Combining the Image-I and the label of
left type1, it means that the animals in
Image-I are all cats, the animals who
can meow and catch mice.
Fact.3m
Combining the Image-I and the label of
left type1, it means that the images in
Image-I are all of the same type, denoted
as “cat”.
Table 1: Understandings of data set for human and machine are different
For machine, there is no cat, the animal who can meow and catch mice; there is only
“cat”, the meaningless symbolic string (Table 1). There are more reasons (see Figure 2).
In French, there is no cat but chat. When programming, there is no cat but 0. In a planet
in the Andromeda Galaxy with the isomorphic civilization of human’s, there is no cat but
dog. The only meaning of a label is to show that those with the same label belong to the
same class, and those with different labels belong to different classes. As for the symbolic
representation of a label, it doesn’t matter.
3.2 Can Smart Enough Algorithm Find Cats?
To answer this question, we need to detail the current machine learning paradigm. All we
have are the data set and learning algorithm. The data set is divided into two (or three)
parts, one of them is used to train by learning algorithm, another one of them is used to test.
However, there is no cat in the data set, and nobody can learn something from nothing.
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The good performance on test set means it performs well to distinguish “cat” from “dog”.
But the “cat” and “dog” is not the same thing as the cat and dog we know, the former
can meow and the latter can bark. For instance, as a well-known example of algorithmic
bias, Google identifies black people as gorillas (Crawford, 2016). However, the truth is
that, Google identifies black people as “gorillas”, the meaningless symbolic string, and we
interpret the “gorillas” as gorillas we know. One might wonder, how could “gorillas” not
be interpret as gorillas we know? However, we are not playing with words, it’s just that
some basic concepts in machine learning have not been established.
4. Reason for Existence of Adversarial Examples
The symbolic representation of a label doesn’t matter, but the relationship between labels
matters. For example, the meaning of “cat” and “dog” can’t be expressed by the data set
in Figure 2, but the following three points can be expressed by the data set: (1) the images
in Image-I are of the same type; (2) the images in Image-II are of the same type; (3) these
two types are not the same. We need to depict the partial isomorphism in a more precise
way, then define adversarial example.
Definition 1 For any field Π, let its universal set be UΠ , for any Y 6= ∅, any function
f : UΠ → Y is called an explanation of field Π.
Definition 2 Let f : UΠ → Y be an explanation of field Π, XΠ ⊆ UΠ , f(XΠ) = {f(x) | x ∈
XΠ}, the surjection fXΠ : XΠ → f(XΠ) satisfying that ∀x ∈ XΠ , fXΠ (x) = f(x) is called the
explanation of f limited to XΠ .
Definition 3 Let f1 : UΠ → Y1 and f2 : UΠ → Y2 be explanations of field Π, let XΠ ⊆ UΠ ,
if there is a bijection g between f1(XΠ) and f2(XΠ) that ∀x ∈ XΠ , fXΠ1 (x) = y1 ⇔ fXΠ2 (x) =
y2 ∧ y2 = g(y1), it’s called that the explanations f1 and f2 are isomorphic on XΠ . If the
explanations f1 and f2 are isomorphic on UΠ , it’s simply called that the explanations f1
and f2 are isomorphic.
Definition 4 Let f : UΠ → Y be an explanation of field Π and XΠ ⊆ UΠ , {(x, fXΠ (x)) |
x ∈ XΠ} is denoted as dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e, if h : UΠ → Z is an explanation of field Π, and
the explanations f and h are isomorphic on XΠ , it’s called h explains dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e, also
called h is an explanation on dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e.
Definition 5 Let f : UΠ → Y be an explanation of field Π, XΠ ⊆ UΠ , h1, h2, h3, · · · , hn
are the enumeration of all the non-isomorphic natural explanations on dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e.
If there is a set G(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e) ⊆ UΠ , satisfying that XΠ ⊆ G(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e), and
for any i, j ≤ n ∧ i 6= j, hi and hj are isomorphic on G(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e), and for any
G(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e) ( W ⊆ UΠ , there are i, j ≤ n ∧ i 6= j to make that hi and hj are not
isomorphic on W , G(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e) is called a generalization set of dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e.
Definition 6 Let f : UΠ → Y be an explanation of field Π, XΠ ⊆ UΠ , if G(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e)
is the generalization set of dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e, A(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e) = UΠ − G(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e),
A(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e) is called the adversarial set of dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e.
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Name Symbol Description
Object Set UΠ the universal set of field Π.
Known Set XΠ XΠ ⊆ UΠ , the set known to us.
Unknown Set UΠ −XΠ the set unknown to us.
Training Set X1Π , X
2
Π , X
3
Π ⊆ XΠ ,
Verification Set X1Π , X
2
Π , X
3
Π X
1
Π ∪X2Π ∪X3Π = XΠ ,
Test Set XiΠ ∩XjΠ = ∅,∀i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, 3.
Data Set XΠ/dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e without/with explanatory information.
Generalization Set G(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e) XΠ ⊆ G(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e) ⊆ UΠ .
Adversarial Set A(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e) A(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e) = UΠ−G(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e).
Table 2: Definition of sets Training set, verification set and test set are the subsets of
known set. Known set is a subset of object set. Generalization set and adversarial set
depend entirely on known set (with explanatory information) and have nothing to do with
learning algorithms. What is known to us is the known set, but what people pay attention
to is always the object set.
object set
generalization set
known set
adversarial set
unknown set
training set
verification set
test set
Figure 3: Relationship between sets Known set ⊆ generalization set ⊆ object set. To
keep expanding known set, generalization set will inevitably expand together, but it doesn’t
mean adversarial set will necessarily be empty gradually, like the example in Section 5.2.
For explanations, they are further divided into natural explanations and unnatural
explanations . The former are the explanations that conform to human cognition of reality,
and the latter are the explanations that don’t. There are always many unnatural expla-
nations that can explain the data set, but they are not convincing. What we concern are
always natural explanations, but there may be non-isomorphic natural explanations that
can all explain the data set. For example, the classical mechanics (from Newton) and spe-
cial relativity (from Einstein), the Euclidean and Lobachevskian geometry, the ZF and
ZFC in axiomatic set theory, they are all non-isomorphic natural explanations. They can
be isomorphic respectively on the the ground truth we have observed in earth before 1887,
the absolute geometry, and ZF . Based on the natural explanations, the generalization set
and adversarial set can be defined (Table 2, Figure 3). The adversarial example can be
defined in this way.
Definition 7 For any dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e, ∀eΠ ∈ UΠ , if eΠ ∈ A(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e), eΠ is an
adversarial example of dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e.
The reason for the existence of adversarial examples is that there are non-isomorphic
natural explanations that can all explain data set. Any eΠ in adversarial set is an adversarial
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example, because it’s unknown which explanation is the desired one, but the outputs of
non-isomorphic natural explanations (on the data set) are different, so any output can be
wrong. All in our mind is the desired explanation we want to express, and according to
this explanation, we generate lots of data and make up the data set. However, we may
not notice that there is an undesired natural explanation on the data set. If the outcome
learned by the learning algorithm happens to be the undesired one, it can perform perfectly
on the known set XΠ , including the training set X
1
Π and test set X
3
Π , but the output for
the adversarial example will be considered to be wrong by us.
5. Incompleteness and Go¨del’s Sentence
In this section, we are concerning about two very specific natural explanations, being true
and being provable. Meanwhile, we will show there are indeed two non-isomorphic nat-
ural explanations on a million-scale data set. Moreover, the two natural explanations are
not insubstantial like castle in the air. They are quite comprehensible and can both be
implemented by concrete and simple algorithms. We will show whether being true and
provable are isomorphic depends on the completeness theorem. For simplicity, let’s start
with propositional logic.
5.1 Peirce’s Law
Here is a data set for a binary classification problem in Table 3, and the full data set can be
found here1, where there are millions of formulas for each class. It’s easy to see the formulas
in class T are all tautologies, and formulas in class C are all contradictions. We can tell the
readers that this assertion is still true for the full data set. However, after machine learning
based on this data set, which class should the Peirce’s law be classified into?
Peirce’s law: ((p→ q)→ p)→ p.
Class T Class C
p→ (q → p) ¬(p→ (q → p))
(p→ (q → r))→ ((p→ q)→ (p→ r)) ¬((p→ (q → r))→ ((p→ q)→ (p→ r)))
¬p→ (p→ q) ¬(¬p→ (p→ q))
(p→ ¬p)→ ¬p ¬((p→ ¬p)→ ¬p)
p→ ¬¬p ¬(p→ ¬¬p)
¬¬¬¬p→ ¬¬p ¬(¬¬¬¬p→ ¬¬p)
¬¬(¬¬¬¬p→ ¬¬p) ¬¬¬(¬¬¬¬p→ ¬¬p)
(p→ q)→ (¬q → ¬p) ¬((p→ q)→ (¬q → ¬p))
(p→ ¬q)→ (q → ¬p) ¬((p→ ¬q)→ (q → ¬p))
¬((¬p→ ¬p)→ ¬(q → ¬¬q)) (¬p→ ¬p)→ ¬(q → ¬¬q)
¬¬(((p→ q)→ p)→ p) ¬(((p→ q)→ p)→ p)
Table 3: Data set of formulas
1. https://github.com/IcePulverizer/Hx
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f¬
0 1
1 0
f→ 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
Table 4: T = 〈{0,1}, f¬, f→〉 |true
g¬
0 1
1 2
2 1
g→ 0 1 2
0 2 1 2
1 2 2 2
2 0 1 2
Table 5: T′ = 〈{0, 1,2}, g¬, g→〉 |provable
It depends on how to explain class T and C. There are at least two natural explanations.
The apparent one is being true, which can be explained by the two-value interpretation
structure T in Table 4, and the formulas in class T are T-{1}-tautologies. Another one is
being provable in HX , which can explained by the three-value interpretation structure T′ in
Table 5, and the formulas in class T are T′-{2}-tautologies. HX is an axiomatic system in
formal language LX . The axioms and rules of inference of HX are in Axiomatic System 8.
The Peirce’s law is true, but unprovable in HX . According to T, the Peirce’s law should be
classified into class T because it’s true. However, according to T′, the Peirce’s law should
be classified into class C because it’s unprovable in HX .
Axiomatic System 8 HX .
The axioms of HX :
X1 p→ (q → p)
X2 (p→ (q → r))→ ((p→ q)→ (p→ r))
X3 ¬p→ (p→ q)
X4 (p→ ¬p)→ ¬p
The rules of inference of HX :
mp (modus ponens): ψ can be obtained from φ→ ψ and φ.
sub (substitution): φ(s) can be obtained from φ, where s is a finite substitution.
Theorem 9 (Soundness) In HX , if φ is provable, φ is a tautology.
Theorem 10 (Incompleteness) In HX , if φ is a tautology but not a T
′-{2}-tautology, φ
is unprovable.
By this instance, vivid answers are given to two questions that what is the ground truth
and what is to be learned. They are both subjective and rely on which explanation is
desired by us, and the data set avails nothing. Furthermore, as the builders of the data
set in Table 3, even if we admit what we want to express by data set is not the formula
that is a tautology or contradiction but the LX -formula that is provable or unprovable in
HX , does this admission matter? We can’t deny that even though the data set is generated
by us according to whether a LX -formula is provable or unprovable in HX by T
′, it can
also be explained by whether a formula is a tautology or contradiction by T. The idea of
the builders of the data set doesn’t matter at all, which is important for us to understand
adversarial examples.
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In our data set, the Peirce’s law is an adversarial example, because there are two non-
isomorphic natural explanations that can both explain the data set. One of them is being
true by T. Another one is being provable (in HX) by T′. They two are non-isomorphic
because the completeness theorem doesn’t hold in HX . The soundness theorem guarantees
that anything provable must be true (Theorem 9). The completeness theorem guarantees
that anything true must be provable. Hence, whether being true and provable are iso-
morphic depends on the soundness and completeness theorem. Since no one can stand an
unsound axiomatic system, we only need to concern about the completeness. However, HX
is incomplete (Theorem 10). The Peirce’s law is true, but unprovable in HX .
5.2 Go¨del’s Sentence
Theorem 11 (Go¨del’s Incompleteness) Let T (PA ⊆ T ) be an axiomatic system, if T
is consistent, there is a sentence σT so that σT and ¬σT are both unprovable in T.
Beyond propositional logic, the Go¨del’s sentence σT , in any consistent first-order ax-
iomatic system T that is sufficient to contain all axioms of PA (first-order Peano arithmetic
axiomatic system), is also an adversarial example. Go¨del’s sentence is constructed by Go¨del
(1931), then improved by Rosser (1936), it’s true but unprovable inside system. Theorem 11
is famous as Go¨del’s first incomplete theorem. Go¨del’s sentence fits our definition of ad-
versarial example, perfectly. First, no one can deny that being true and provable are two
natural explanations. Second, for any consistent existing data set, there must be an ax-
iomatic system T to guarantee being true and provable are isomorphic on this data set.
Third, there will be the Go¨del’s sentence σT that is true but unprovable.
Go¨del’s sentence has a very good property, to interpret the unsolvability of it as an
adversarial example. According to Figure 3, the direct way to eliminate or alleviate ad-
versarial examples is to shrink the adversarial set A(dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e). Therefore, we only
need to expend the data set/known set dXΠ , fXΠ (XΠ)e. More technically, this solution is
nothing more than adding adversarial examples, with the labels according to the desired
explanation, to the data set, then training again with this new data set, known as adversar-
ial training. We may take for granted that adversarial examples may be solved in this way,
because at least these old adversarial examples should have been solved. However, this is
just a misty imagination, and demon is always in the mistiness.
Go¨del’s sentence is an adversarial example, but Go¨del’s sentence is ineliminable. In any
consistent system T (PA ⊆ T ), there is a Go¨del’s sentence σT , which is true but unprovable
in T , so T is incomplete. If σT is added to T as a axiom, to form a new system T
′(T ′ =
T ∪ {σT }), of course σT will be both true and provable in T ′. However, in T ′, there will be
a new Go¨del’s sentence σT ′ , which is true but unprovable in T
′, so T ′ is still incomplete,
which is guaranteed by Go¨del’s first incomplete theorem. This process can be repeated as
any finite times as you like, but the last system you get is still incomplete, for example, the
Go¨del’s sentence of the last system is still true but unprovable. The incomplete theorem
will always hold, so the adversarial example is unsolvable, because the adversarial set won’t
be empty forever.
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6. Incomputability for Adversarial Examples
The adversarial example above is unsolvable, because there are always at least two non-
isomorphic natural explanations that can explain the data set. However, that the adversarial
set can’t be empty doesn’t mean what the learning algorithm has learned must be the
undesired explanation. What if the learning algorithm happens to learn the desired one?
First, Turing does not believe this telepathy deserves attention (Turing, 2009), and neither
do we. Second, in Section 5.1, we have shown that the idea of the builders of the data
set doesn’t matter at all. Third, taking all information into account, like the details of
learning algorithm, the details of data set and the performance on training set, verification
set or test set, nothing can be concluded about it. Finally, even if this lottery thing is
to happen, we can’t know it effectively that we are to win the lottery. Similarly, for any
Turing machine and any input string, the Turing machine must halt or not halt on it, but
we can’t know it effectively, which is famous as the halting problem of Turing machine, and
it’s undecidable(Turing, 1937). We will prove that whether a learning algorithm can learn
the desired one is unrecognizable (Theorem 16). The description of symbols is in Table 6
and dependence in DesiredOne in Theorem 16 is in Figure 4. Therefore, even if the outputs
for all adversarial examples indeed conform to the explanation we desire, we can’t know it
effectively by algorithm or computing.
Symbol Description
M,M ′ Turing machine.
ω, x input string.
TM Turing machine space, the set consisting of all Turing machines.
H(M) the set consisting of all strings, on which M halts.
M(ω) the output of M on ω, ω ∈ H(M).
dX,M(X)e {(x,M(x)) | x ∈ X}
〈O1, O2, · · · , On〉 the encoding string of objects O1, O2, · · · , On.
L1 ≤m L2 Language L1 is many-one reducible to language L2.
Table 6: Description of symbols
E
IO
= F?
Data set
dX,E(X)e
Learning Turing
machine—A
Target Turing
machine—E
Outcome Turing
machine—F
2.As input
3.Output1.Generate
4. 4.
Figure 4: Dependence in DesiredOne in Theorem 16
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Definition 12 For any Turing machine M and M ′, M and M ′ are input-output equivalent
if and only if H(M) = H(M ′) and ∀ω ∈ H(M),M(ω) = M ′(ω), denoted as M IO= M ′.
Theorem 13 If L1 ≤m L2 and L1 is unrecognizable, L2 is unrecognizable.
Halt = {〈M,ω〉 |M ∈ TM, ω ∈ H(M).}
Theorem 14 (Halting problem) Halt is undecidable and unrecognizable.
Same = {〈M1,M2〉 |M1,M2 ∈ TM,M1 IO= M2.}
Theorem 15 Same is unrecognizable.
Proof We prove Halt ≤m Same, so we need to prove G : Halt ≤m Same:
G = “For input 〈M,ω〉, in which M ∈ TM and ω is a string:
1. Construct the following two machines M1 and M2.
M1 = ‘For any input x:
(a) Be circular.’
M2 = ‘For any input x:
(a) Run M on ω. If M halts on ω, output ω and halt.’
2. Output 〈M1,M2〉.”
DesiredOne = {〈A,E,X〉 | A,E ∈ TM, X ⊆ H(E), A(〈dX,E(X)e〉) = 〈F 〉, E IO= F.}
Theorem 16 DesiredOne is unrecognizable.
Proof G : Same ≤m DesiredOne:
G = “For input 〈M1,M2〉, in which M1,M2 ∈ TM:
1. Construct the machine A.
A = ‘For any input ω:
(a) Output 〈M2〉 and halt.’
2. Output 〈A,M1,∅〉.”
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we show the reason for the existence of adversarial examples is there are
non-isomorphic natural explanations that can all explain data set. Specifically, Go¨del’s
sentence is an adversarial example but ineliminable, because the two natural explanations
of being true and provable are always non-isomorphic, which is guaranteed by Go¨del’s
first incomplete theorem. Therefore, it can’t be solved by the re-accumulation of data
set or the re-improvement of learning algorithm. Any data set can’t eliminate the inherent
incompleteness and any learning algorithm can’t distinguish which explanation is the desired
one. Finally, we prove the incomputability for adversarial examples that whether a learning
algorithm can learn the desired explanation is unrecognizable.
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